We consider a joint inventory-pricing problem in which buyers act strategically and bid for units of a firm's product over an infinite horizon. The number of bidders in each period, as well as the individual bidders' valuations, are random but stationary over time. There is a holding cost for inventory and a unit cost for ordering more stock from an outside supplier. Backordering is not allowed. The firm must decide how to conduct its auctions and how to replenish its stock over time to maximize its profits.
Introduction
Auctions have gained renewed popularity recently with the rise of the Internet, and in both consumer and industrial sectors there has been a rash of experimentation with auctions and other alternative pricing mechanisms over the last few years [22] . This trend raises some important theoretical and practical questions. In particular, given the flexibility that online commerce provides, what pricing mechanisms are optimal for sellers in any given context? How should these mechanisms be implemented? How much benefit can alternative mechanisms provide over list pricing? And under what conditions are they most beneficial?
In this paper, we provide answers to these questions for a firm operating in an infinite horizon, inventory-pricing setting. Specifically, we consider a firm that orders, stores and sells a good over an infinite horizon. The situation can be considered as a stylized representation of a retailer, distributor or producer who uses an auction mechanism for selling its products.
The firm purchases its good at a constant unit cost from an outside supplier and incurs an increasing, convex holding cost on its inventory. There is zero leadtime for replenishment. Demand in each period is characterized as a random number of buyers, each of whom has his own, private value for the firm's good. The statistics of demand are assumed stationary over time and are known to the seller and all buyers. This demand model follows the assumptions of classical auction theory as described in the seminal work of Vickrey [23] , the influential paper of Milgrom and Weber [12] , the recent survey by Klemperer [6] and earlier survey articles: McAfee and McMillan [10] , Milgrom [11] , Rothkopf and Harstad [17] , Matthews [9] and Wolfstetter [25] . As in this auction literature, we assume buyers act strategically to maximize their utility (i.e. their value minus the price they pay). As a result, the buyers' behavior depends on the auction and inventory policy of the firm. The firms must decide on an auction mechanism -that is, a set of rules for allocating goods to buyers and collecting payments from them -and a strategy for replenishing its stock that maximize its profits over an infinite horizon. We consider both the discounted and average profit criterion.
We analyze this problem using results from Maskin and Riley [8] , who show that the expected revenue for a seller in an auction depends only on the allocation -that is, which buyers receive the goods and which do not. By formulating a dynamic program in these allocation variables, we are able to characterize the optimal allocation and replenishment strategy for the firm. We then show that this optimal allocation can be achieved by conducting a first-price or second-price auction with a fixed reserve price in every period. The reserve price is related only to the replenishment cost of the good. The optimal replenishment policy is to order up to a fixed basestock level at the end of each period.
Thus, the optimal policy is quite simple and familiar; namely, use a traditional auction with a reserve price for pricing and use a traditional basestock policy for replenishment. Moreover, the policy is easy to compute, and in the average-cost case reduces to a single parameter search over a closed-form profit function. We also extend these results to variations of the model, including the case where the firm sells in two markets -one fixed price market and one auction market.
We then compare the optimal auction mechanism to a list price policy, which uses a fixed price in each period together with a basestock policy for replenishment. (The price and basestock level are jointly optimized.) This list price policy is shown to be optimal in several limiting cases, including the case where there is only one buyer per period, the case where the number of buyers per period tends to infinity, and the case where the holding cost is zero. A numerical study shows how the optimal auction mechanism compares to list pricing more generally. The results indicate that the optimal auction is significantly better than list pricing under relatively specialized conditions, namely when the number of buyers per period is moderate (e.g. 5 to 10), the carrying cost is large (e.g. holding cost rates of 1% of the value of the goods per period or higher), and when the variation in the number of buyers in a period is high. One can argue that many consumer and industrial markets do not match these conditions; many consumer markets have high-volume demand and carrying costs per period are less than 1%, though for specialty, low-volume products or big-ticket, high-tech products like personal computers, these conditions may hold. In some industrial markets -the sale of capital equipment for example -one is encounters a modest volume of buyers and high holding costs, in which case the optimal auction mechanism can offer a significant improvements in profit. Still, our results suggest that simple list pricing is near-optimal in many cases, which perhaps partially explains its continued popularity despite the promise of Internet-based auctions. 1 
Literature review
While there is wide variety of work on auctions (see the survey articles mentioned above), analyzing auctions in an inventory setting is a relatively new topic. In a finite-horizon setting without replenishment, Segev et.al. [18] analyze a problem in which an auctioneer tries to sell multiple units of a product using a multi-period auction; however, they assume costumer bidding behavior is determined exogenously by a Markov chain. Pinker et.al. [15] study how to run a sequence of standard k-unit auctions, determining the lot size k for each auction, the number of auctions to run and the duration of each of them. Our earlier work, Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24] , analyzes an optimal auction for a firm selling a fixed inventory over a finite horizon, and the approach we use here for the infinite horizon problem with replenishment closely follows it.
Our work is also closely related to research on stochastic inventory-pricing problems, for example Federgruen and Heching [4] , Li [7] , Amihud and Mendelson [1] , Thomas [19] , Thowsen [20] and Zabel [26] . Indeed, our problem is in many ways an auction version of the one studied by Federgruen and Heching [4] . They considered a problem in which a firm may choose a state-dependent list price and make replenishment decisions in each period. They showed that in the infinite horizon, stationary case, the optimal policy is a so-called basestock, list price policy defined by two critical values p * and z * ; if the inventory is above z * , the firm orders nothing and selects an inventorydependent price below p * , which is decreasing in the inventory on hand; if the inventory is below z * , the optimal policy is to order up to z * and price at p * . Thus, once the inventory level drops below z * , the optimal policy is to use a fixed price and a fixed basestock level. These results are essentially the fixed-price analogs of our results in Theorems 1 and 2 for the auction case. We also compare our results to a list price mechanism of this type in Section 4.1.
Overview
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 1 we review the results we use on optimal auction design, formulate our inventory-pricing problem as a dynamic program and present the main structural results on the optimal auction and replenishment policy. Section 2 provides the proof of these main theorems. In Section 3 we analyze various extensions of the model, including that case where the firm has demand from both a fixed price and an auction market and the case of the long-run-average profit criterion. In Section 4, we then compare the optimal auction policy to a fixed price mechanism. Both theoretical and numerical comparisons are given. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
Notation
We will keep the following notation: All vectors are assumed to be in R n + unless otherwise specified. v j denotes the j th component of vector v, and v −j ≡ (v 1 , . . . , v j−1 , v j+1 , . . . , v n ) is the vector of components other than j. Subscripts between parentheses stand for reverse order statistics; that is, for any vector v,
The set Z + is conformed by the non-negative integers. The positive part of a number a is a + ≡ max{a, 0}. Analogously, a − ≡ − min{a, 0}.
LHS and RHS are shorthands for left hand side and right hand side respectively; iid is shorthand for independent and identically distributed. A function is said to be increasing (decreasing) when it is non-decreasing (non-increasing).
For a discrete-valued function G(x), we define the difference ∆G(x) ≡ G(x) − G(x − 1), and say that G(·) is concave (convex) when ∆G(x) is decreasing (increasing) in x.
Optimal auctions, model formulation and statement of main results
In this section, we first review some results we require from the theory of optimal auctions. Readers familiar with auction theory may skip or only skim this first part. We then formulate an inventorypricing problem using this auction theory and state our main theoretical results on the optimal, dynamic auction-ordering policy. The proof of these results is provided in the next section.
Review of results from the theory of optimal auctions
The basic results on optimal auctions that we use are from Myerson [13] , Riley and Samuelson [16] and Maskin and Riley [8] . The first two papers give the mathematical formulation of optimal auction design for a single good, and the third one extends these results to the multi-unit setting.
Consider an auction in which we are selling one or more homogeneous objects to n buyers. Each buyer i wants at most one of the objects, which he values at v i . As mentioned above, the values v i are private information, but it is common knowledge that v i 's are iid with distribution F .
An auction mechanism is a description of the auction, which specifies both allocation and payment rules. It is chosen by the seller, and is common knowledge. For example, in a k-unit first-price auction mechanism, buyers submit bids; the k highest bids win (the allocation rule), and all winners pay the amount offered (the payment rule). In a second-price auction, buyers submit bids; the k highest bids win (the allocation rule), but all winners pay the first loosing bid, i.e. the (k + 1) th bid (the payment rule). The buyers' behavior depends on the auction mechanism. Assuming that buyers choose their strategies without collusion, they play a noncooperative game of incomplete information. The appropriate solution concept in this context is that of a Bayesian equilibrium of Harsanyi [5] , an extension of the ordinary Nash equilibrium [14] .
Extending Myerson's [13] results from single-unit auctions, Maskin and Riley [8] showed the rather remarkable fact that the expected seller's revenue can be expressed only as a function of the allocation rule. Specifically, let the allocation functions can be expressed as
If the functions q i (·, v −i ) are increasing in v i and buyers with value zero have zero expected surplus in equilibrium, then the expected revenue to the seller is given by
where
and
is the hazard rate function associated with the distribution F . The function J(v) is what Myerson [13] calls the bidder's "virtual value". From (2), it follows that all mechanisms that result in the same allocations q for each realization of v yield the same expected revenue.
For example, in a standard k-unit auction, one can show that both the first-price and secondprice auctions award the k goods to the buyers with the k highest valuations. Thus, the allocation q(v) is the same for each v and hence they generate the same expected revenue for the seller. This is true despite the fact that the bidding strategies and payments in each case are quite different.
Moreover, the expression (2) can be used to design an optimal mechanism. This is achieved by simply choosing the allocation rule q * (v) that maximizes n i=1 J(v i )q i (v i , v −i ) subject to any constraints one might have on the allocation (e.g. we have at most k items to allocate so we may require that the allocation q satisfy q i ≤ k). It is useful to make the following monotonicity assumption:
This assumption simply ensures that higher-value bidders contribute higher expected revenues in (2) . It holds when the hazard rate ρ(v) either increases or does not decline too fast with v (formally speaking, we require
, and is satisfied by most standard distributions. 2 To illustrate, define
(and by convention, v * = ∞ if J(v) < 0 ∀v). Then from (2) it follows that it is never optimal to allocate a unit to a buyer with valuation v i < v * . This simple observation is the basis for determining optimal reserve prices. Indeed, consider a standard k unit auction with a second-price mechanism and reserve price v * . One can show in this case that bidders bid their true values v i and the items are awarded to the k highest bidders with valuations above v * , which in fact produces the allocation q * (v) that maximizes (2) subject to the constraint that at most k items can be awarded.
Thus, the analysis of optimal auctions proceeds in two steps: 1) First, find an optimal allocation q * (v) that maximizes the revenue (or revenue net of costs) subject to any constraints one might have on the allocation; and then, 2) find an auction mechanism that achieves the allocation q * (v) for each realization v. Each of these steps requires a separate analysis. In the next section, we apply this approach to analyze an inventory-pricing problem.
An inventory-pricing model
A firm orders, stores and then sells units of an homogeneous good over an infinite time horizon. The firm starts a period with an initial (integral) inventory, denoted x, and it reorders at a unit cost c at the end of the period. Replenishment orders arrive instantly and backlogging is not allowed. A convex, strictly increasing holding cost of h(x) is charged on the starting inventory level x. 3 The firm sells its goods through a sequence of auctions, indexed by t ≥ 1. The time index runs forward, so larger values of t represent later points in time. The problem is assumed to be stationary, so the statistics of demand are the same for all periods t. In each period, N risk neutral potential buyers (bidders) arrive. N is a non-negative, discrete-valued random variable, distributed according 2 In particular, distributions that have increasing hazard rate include the uniform, normal, logistic, exponential and extreme value (double exponential) distributions, etc. (See Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2] .) 3 We also analyze the case where holding cost is charged on the ending inventory level. See Section 3.1.
to a known probability mass function g(·) with support [0, M] for some M > 0, and strictly positive first moment. Each buyer requires one unit and has a reservation value v i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , which represents the maximum amount buyer i is willing to pay for the good. Reservation values are private information, independent and identically distributed draws from a distribution F (·), which is strictly increasing with a continuous density function f (·) on the support [v, v] , with F (v) = 0 and F (v) = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume v = 0 throughout. We assume that the virtual value J(·) derived from F (·) satisfies Assumption 1.
We will use v both for the random vector of valuations (from the seller's perspective), and for a particular realization. The distribution functions g and F are constant through time t, and are assumed common knowledge to the firm and all potential buyers. In addition, each buyer i knows his own (private) valuation v i . We assume that both the number of bidders N and their valuations v are independent from one period to the next. Thus, each period is an independent draw of N and v.
A few comments on these demand assumptions are in order. While they are made primarily for analytical tractability and do places some limitations on the model, they are not entirely unrealistic assumptions. For example, consider the assumption about the independence of bids over time. While this may preclude situations where buyers were strategically attempting to time their purchases, we show below that the optimal policy eventually becomes one of running a sequence of identical auctions (same number of items, allocation rules, payments, etc.) in each period. Hence, the incentive to strategize over timing on the part of customers is diminished. The independence of N and v over time would also not be valid if the firm could "learn" the valuations of customers through repeated observation of their bidding behavior. But in cases where there are a large numbers of buyers each of whom purchases infrequently, the ability to learn about any given buyer's valuation is limited and one can treat the values as approximately independent. Finally, independence would not be valid if customers who failed to win in the auction made repeated purchase attempts in subsequent periods. Again, however, such behavior could arguably be ignored if customers are assumed to be impatient and typically purchase elsewhere (e.g. a competitor or fixed-price channel) if they do not succeed in the auction -or are simply not permitted to rebid, as in the case of mechanism used by Priceline.com. So there are realistic conditions under which the independence assumption is a reasonable one.
The firm's problem is to design an auction mechanism and find a replenishment policy that maximizes its expected discounted profit. As above, the auction mechanism is a set of rules for allocations and payments (the mechanism) according to which the auction will be conducted. Each buyer, based on his private valuation, his knowledge of the distribution functions F, g, and the set of rules established by the auctioneer, chooses his bid (or strategy) in order to maximize his expected utility. Then, the firm observes the set of submitted bids and applies the rules specified earlier to decide the number of units to award in the current period, whom to award the units to and the payments to be made by the bidders (typically only the winners pay).
Dynamic programming formulation
We analyze this problem using a dynamic programming formulation in terms of the allocation variables q(v) defined by (1) . Define the value function V (x) as the maximum expected discounted profit given an initial inventory x = 0, 1, ..., which satisfies the Bellman's equation:
where 0 < α < 1 is the discount factor, p is the total number of units awarded and y is the replenishment order for the next period. Note from first principles the state space can be bounded by M , because at most M buyers will arrive in any period, and since we can reorder at the end of every period, there is no need to stock more than M . Our objective is finding an optimal stationary policy, denoted u * (x), consisting of an allocation q(·) and a replenishment order y(·), that achieves V (x).
We can reformulate our DP using the variables q i . Using Assumption 1, we can take advantage of the monotonicity of the J(·). In this case, when the firm decides to award p units, it is optimal to assign them to the highest J(v i )'s (i.e., to the highest v i 's). Using reverse order statistics, define:
Note that R(p) is a random function and that
so we can rewrite (4) in terms of p as follows:
Note above we are assuming free disposal when N < p ≤ x. This assumption is not essential for our analysis, but it helps to simplify the notation.
Statement of main theorems
We next state our main theorems, which characterize the optimal auction and replenishment policy for our problem. The first statement is presented in algorithmic form and the proof is provided in the next section.
Theorem 1 Consider the inventory-pricing problem described in (6). Define the optimal basestock level by
Then the optimal stationary policy u * (x) is to allocate units to buyers and replenish stock as follows:
STEP 1: Allocate units
For p = 1, 2, . . . , min{x, N }, allocate the p th if either:
else, do not award the p th unit and goto STEP 2.
STEP 2: Replenish stock
If x − p < z * , then order up to z * , i.e. y = z * + p − x; else order nothing (y = 0).
The policy says that while the current inventory is above the optimal basestock level z * (Case i)), then we will award the p th unit if the benefit from accepting the p th bid (it's virtual value J(v (p) )) exceeds the profit of keeping the p th unit for the next period less the marginal holding cost for keeping it. The p th unit is not replenished in this case. Once the inventory reaches the optimal level z * (Case ii)), the firm awards a unit as long as the benefit from accepting a bid exceeds the cost of replacing the unit awarded; each such unit is replenished.
An interesting result of this allocation policy is that when the inventory is less than the optimal basestock level z * , the seller can achieve the optimal allocation by simply running a standard first-price or second-price auction in each period with a fixed reserve pricê
Indeed, we have the following characterization of the optimal policy in this case:
Theorem 2 Once the inventory reaches z * units, the optimal policy in all subsequent periods is to:
1) run a standard first-price or second-price, z * -unit auction with fixed reserve priceĉ; and then 2)
at the end of each period, order up to the optimal basestock level z * .
Since the problem is over an infinite horizon and the optimal policy only calls for ordering when the inventory drops below z * , the firm eventually reaches a point where the above simple auction and replenishment policy is optimal for all remaining time.
This result is significant on several levels. First, it shows that the classical first-price and second-price mechanisms remain optimal in the dynamic inventory setting. These are both familiar auction mechanisms, which are easy for buyers to understand and easy for sellers to implement. The inventory replenishment policy is also a familiar and simple basestock policy. This combination makes the optimal policy quite practical. On a theoretical level, the result is as simple as one could hope for in this setting. Finally, it is convenient as well from a computational perspective, because it reduces the optimal policy to a simply search over the single parameter z * , as we show below in Section 3.4.
Analysis of the optimal policy
As mentioned above, the analysis proceeds in two steps. We first analyze the theoretical properties of the dynamic program (4) to characterize the optimal allocations of Theorem 1. We then use the structure of the optimal policy to define two auction mechanisms that achieve this allocation. These mechanisms reduce to the standard first-price and second-price auction when the inventory is below z * , which is the statement of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 1
We analyze the infinite horizon DP (6) as the limit of its corresponding finite horizon version. Define the finite horizon version of the DP as follows
with boundary conditions
We require the following lemma, characterizing the inner optimization in (8):
Lemma 1 Suppose G(x) is concave and bounded above, and consider the problem
Let z * be such that
Thus, the optimal solution (y * , p * ) satisfies:
i)
Proof. To prove the first part, take (9) and fix a value of p, the number of units to award. We are then facing a problem only in the number of units to order from the supplier, y(p). Define the inventory position z ≡ z(p) = x − p + y(p). We can then express (9) as a problem in z:
By the concavity of G(·) and the convexity of h(·), the z * in (10) is the optimal solution of this reformulated problem. Then,
and in particular, y * ≡ y * (p * ) for some optimal p * to be determined. For part ii), note that y * (p) = max{z * , x− p} − x + p, turning (9) into a problem just in decision variable p:
For any 0 ≤ p ≤ x, we consider two cases according to its value: a) If p < x − z * , then we can rewrite (11) as
which is equivalent to
where the sum is defined to be 0 if p = 0.
where again the sum is defined to be 0 if p = 0.
Essentially, the optimality of the proposed p * is based on proving that the expression to maximize in (11) has decreasing increments in p. According to both observations above, we split the analysis in two cases: for case a), note that ∆R(p) − α ∆G(x − p + 1) + ∆h(x − p + 1) is decreasing in p (∆R(p) is decreasing by Assumption 1, ∆G(·) is increasing in p by its concavity, and ∆h(·) is decreasing in p by its convexity); for case b), observe that by (5),
Then, by Assumption 1, ∆R(p) − c is decreasing in p.
To complete the proof, we have to check what happens at the transition point p = x − z * . That is, we need to check if the last increment to its left is greater or equal than the first increment to its right, or in symbols, if
By optimality of z * (see formula (10)),
Since we also know that ∆R(·) is decreasing, then
and equation (12) is verified. Hence, the expression between the large brackets in (11) has decreasing increments in p, and p * is the largest p for which this increment remains positive. 2
To apply Lemma 1 to the finite horizon problem (8), we must verify that V t−1 (·) is bounded and concave. Indeed, take a realization (n t , v) for problem (8) , and assume that V t−1 (·) is concave and bounded. By letting G(·) = V t−1 (·), Lemma 1 gives closed form expressions for the optimal inventory level z * t−1 ≡ z * , the optimal number of items to award p * (x) ≡ p * , and the optimal number of units to replenish, y * (x) ≡ y * .
The next lemma establishes the boundedness of the value function. Its proof is in the Appendix.
We will also require the following Lemma, which states that under the concavity condition if we have one more unit available to sell, we allocate at most one more unit to the buyers. It also relates the optimal allocation number to the optimal replenishment number. These properties are helpful both theoretically and computationally (see the Appendix for a proof).
The following theorem establishes that V t (·) is indeed concave; that is, the marginal value of capacity, ∆V t (x), is decreasing in the remaining inventory (its proof is included in the Appendix):
Proceeding with the finite horizon version in (8), we next show that we can constrain the feasible set for y so that the per-period profit is bounded both above and below (see the Appendix for a proof).
Lemma 5 There existȳ ∈ Z + and L > 0, such that y * ≤ȳ and
In particular, we can considerȳ =z, wherez ≡ max{z ∈ Z + : αv − c > ∆h(z)} is an upper bound for any optimal per-period inventory level. 4 Because both the per-period profit and initial function V 0 (x) are bounded, from Bertsekas [3, Section 1.2, Assumption D and Proposition 2.1] we have that
Furthermore, from Proposition 2.2 in Bertsekas [3, Section 1.2], the limiting function V (x) is the unique solution to Bellman's equation (6) . This limit allows us to extend the concavity to the infinite horizon profit function.
Lemma 6 ∆V (x) is decreasing in x.
Proof. Since ∆V t (x) ≥ ∆V t (x + 1), taking limit both sides as t → ∞, and using the property described by (13) , ∆V (x) ≥ ∆V (x + 1) as well. 2
From Lemma 2, V (·) is bounded above. And since it is also concave, Lemma 1 gives a complete characterization of the minimizer for the RHS in that formulation, by taking the function G(·) ≡ V (·). Following Bertsekas [3, Section 1.2, Proposition 2.3], that minimizer is an optimal stationary policy. Indeed, we get the following technical description of the optimal policy, which translates algorithmically into our main Theorem 1:
Afterwards, order y * units for replenishment, with
Finally, observe that our system can be viewed as a finite state Markov Chain, with states {0, 1, . . . , z * , . . . ,z}. The dynamics of the system are driven by the random variables (N, v), which induce a change in state through the decision variables p * and y * . Because of the structure of the optimal policy, it can be shown that the unique recurrent state is z * (i.e., z * is an absorbing state).
Analysis of the optimal auction mechanism
The next step in our analysis of the problem is to construct auction mechanisms that implement the optimal allocation policy derived above. We will follow ideas introduced in Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24] to demonstrate that modified versions of two standard procedures -the first and second-price auctions -achieve the optimal allocation. We only outline the basic result for each mechanism in turn, and the reader is referred to [24] for more details.
Second-price auction
In a traditional open, k-unit, ascending price auction; or in the sealed-bid, second-price -Vickreyauction, where all k winners pay the (k + 1) th highest bid, the dominant strategy for a buyer is to bid his true value. However, if one uses a straightforward application of the second-price mechanism in our setting, this is no longer true.
The following modified second-price mechanism avoids this pitfall: For i ≥ 1, let
The thresholdsv i are directly computable from the solution of (6), which uses common knowledge information, and is in principle known to all buyers and the seller. Following the argument in Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24, Section 3.3.1]., suppose the firm acts as if a customer's bid is equal to his value. Then, given the vector of submitted bids b, the seller will award k items, where
and k = 0 if b (1) ≤v 1 . All winners will pay
where b (k+1) is the (k + 1) th highest bid andv k is the threshold to award the k th unit. Ties between bids are broken by randomization. Under this modified second-price mechanism, one can show that it is a dominant strategy for buyers to bid their own values. (See Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24, Section 3.3.1] for a detailed argument.) Moreover, because bids are equal to values, this mechanism achieves the optimal allocation of Theorem 1. Finally, note that when x ≤ z * , this mechanism is equivalent to a standard second-price auction with fixed reserve price J −1 (c), since bids are awarded to the x highest value customers with virtual values in excess of J −1 (c), which proves first part of Theorem 2.
First-price auction
In a first-price auction, items are awarded to the highest bidders and winners pay their bids. Note that if we can show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy B(·) that is strictly increasing in the bidders' values, then the firm can invert this bid function to infer each bidder's value, which it can then use to optimally award items.
Regarding the auction setup, the bidders are informed of the current inventory x, and of the following allocation rule: given a vector of bids b, the seller will award k items, where k = max{i ≥ 1 : B −1 (b (i) ) >v i }, and k = 0 if B −1 (b (1) ) ≤v 1 , wherev i is defined by (14) . The items are awarded to the highest bidders, and winners pay their bids. Our first result is the following (see Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24, Section 3.3.2 and Appendix] for a proof):
The first-price auction has a symmetric, equilibrium, strictly increasing, bidding strategy b i = B(v i ). The strategy B depends on the current value of x as given bŷ
where P (v) is the probability that a bidder with value v is among the winners,
and p * (v) = max{0 ≤ i ≤ min{x, N } : v >v i }, and by convention,v 0 < 0.
Again, given this strictly increasing bidding function, the seller can invert the bids to determine a buyer's value. This information can then be used to implement the optimal by checking for p = 1, 2, ..., min{x, N} whether B −1 (b (p) ) >v p and stopping once this condition is violated. The resulting allocation and number of bids accepted, p, will then be optimal, which proves the remaining part of Theorem 2.
Note that (15) shows, as one would expect, that under our first-price mechanism, since winners pay what they bid, buyers shade their values in order to make some positive surplus.
Some extensions to the basic model
In this section, we consider some natural extensions to our auction model. We look at these in increasing order of difficulty.
Charging the holding cost at the end of the period
Suppose now that we change our original setting by having the holding cost charged at the end of each of the periods, rather than at their starting points. The dynamic program in this case is the same as (6), but replacing the term h(x − p + y) by h(x − p). A basestock policy remains optimal, but now the optimal basestock level is given by:
Regarding the number of units to award, we follow Lemma 1, part ii): for case (a) the allocation rule is the same, but it changes for case (b) by introducing the marginal holding cost. The optimal policy in Theorem 1 becomes:
else, do not award the p-th unit and goto STEP 2. STEP 2: Replenish stock If x − p < z * , then order up to z * , i.e. y = z * + p − x; else order nothing (y = 0).
The case x − p ≤ z * , corresponding to the steady state of the system, can lead to more complicated auction mechanisms (see Section 2.2) than the ones presented in Theorem 2. However, if the holding cost is linear, so that h(z) = h z, then ∆h(x − p + 1) = h, a constant, and it is again optimal to run a first or second-price auction with a fixed reserve price, though the optimal reserve price is now J −1 (c − h). This lowered reserve price (with respect toĉ = J −1 (c)) reflects the fact that now the seller is willing to accept lower bids in order to avoid one period of holding cost.
Backorders
Consider the infinite horizon problem of Sections 1.2 and 1.3, but suppose the firm could award units beyond the current inventory level by backordering, incurring a penalty cost of b(k) when k is the number of buyers backlogged. We assume that the function b(·) is convex increasing.
Following formulation (6), the DP for this case is
All the analysis developed can be extended to this setting, and we get similar formulas for z * and y * to the ones found in Lemma 1: The main change is that the calculation of p * involves the backorder cost once the seller goes beyond the stock on hand. Following the outline in the proof of Lemma 1, in this case we have cases (a) and (b) as before, plus a new case (c) corresponding to the situation p > x. It can be checked that when N bidders show up in a particular period, the optimal p is then
Regarding the mechanism design for this case, we should modify the definition ofv i in (14) to account for the backorder cost. So, suppose that the backorder cost is linear, of the form b(w) = b w, with b > c. Then,
That means that once the inventory drops below the optimal stationary inventory z * , the firm essentially sets two reserve prices: one for the available on-hand units, and a higher one for the backlogged units. Both the first-price and second-price mechanisms can be extended to work in this case as well.
Combined auction and list-price model
Often, firms that sell with an auction mechanism also use a regular, fixed-price mechanism in parallel. In the retail setting, this is often achieved by using each mechanism in a different channel (e.g. catalogue and web channels). 5 In industrial settings, a firm may have fixed price demand as a result of long-term contracts, while at the same time participates in auctions from spot-purchase customers. We model this situation as follows: Consider the infinite horizon problem described in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, but assume that demand comes from two different and independent streams of customers. In each period, there are N A potential buyers that participate in the auction market, with valuations v drawn from a strictly increasing distribution F as before, and N L buyers that participate in the list-price market. We assume that N A follows a probability mass function g A (·), and that N L follows a p.m.f. g L (·). F , g A and g L are common knowledge.
In the list-price market, we assume all N L buyers are willing to purchase at a fixed price r > c, but the firm may ration its supply and only sell to a subset of these customers (or none at all). Let V (x) denotes the seller's expected discounted profit given a starting inventory of x as before. Let q i be the allocation binary variables for the auction, and p L be the number of units to award to the list-price buyers. The value function satisfies the Bellman's equation:
where 0 < α < 1 is the discount factor. In essence, the idea in analyzing this problem is simply to treat the N L buyers in the fixed price market as if they all had virtual values of r and combine them with the buyers in the auction market. Then one finds the optimal allocation as before.
Following our previous arguments, relax the integrality of the variables q i and redefine the function R(p) as in (5) . We rank bidders' virtual values together with the price r, and if p is the total number of units to award through both channels, then R(p) will represent the profit obtainable by optimally awarding those p units (not accounting for costs). Let
be the random variable representing the number of buyers in the auction market with virtual values above the fixed price r. If v (i) is the i th reverse order statistic in the auction market, define
so we can rewrite (16) in terms of p as follows:
We have thus reduced this case to a form essentially identical to our formula (6) of Section 1.3, observing that ∆R(p) is by construction decreasing in p. The allocation policy is therefore the same as before, again assuming we treat the fixed-price market buyers as if they are simply buyers with virtual valuations of r. For example, suppose r > J(v) so that the fixed price is greater than any virtual value observed in the auction market (e.g. the auction is a "deep discount" market). Then the optimal policy (assuming the starting inventory is at its steady state value of z * ) is to award as many units to the fixed-price market as possible. If there is any excess, it is sold in the auction market to the highest bidders with virtual values in excess of J −1 (c). Afterwards, the firm replenishes its stock to bring its inventory up to z * and the process repeats.
Average profit criterion
We next examine the long-run average profit per stage objective. This criterion leads to further simplification in computing the optimal policy and is useful in its own right.
Let p t and y t be the optimal number of units to award and replenish in period t, respectively, with t ≥ 1. Let V (x) be the maximum expected average profit when starting with x 0 = x units of inventory in period t = 0. This version of the problem can then be formulated as finding (non-anticipating) values p t , y t that maximizes
where the function R(·) is defined in (5) . One can show that the optimal policy for our α-discounted problem is in fact Blackwell optimal (see Bertsekas [3, Section 4.2, Definition 1.1]); that is, it is simultaneously optimal for all discounted problems with discount factors α ∈ (ᾱ, 1), for some 0 <ᾱ < 1. Therefore, using Proposition 2.2 in Bertsekas [3, Section 4.2], u * (x) is optimal for the average profit problem within the class of all stationary policies. Moreover, since we have seen that u * (x) involves just one recurrent state, represented by the optimal inventory level z * , then it is unichain. 6 Thus, by Proposition 2.6, condition 1, in Bertsekas [3, Section 4.2], u * (x) is optimal within the class of all admissible policies. Furthermore, the corresponding average profit in equation (17) is independent of the initial state x. As a result, the optimal average profit policy will again be to run a standard first-price or secondprice auction in each period with reserve price J −1 (c) and then order up to a fixed basestock level z * at the end of each period.
Indeed, as a result from this fact, we can develop a quite simple procedure for finding the optimal basestock level z * in the average profit case. Let Π(z), described by
be the average profit when following a policy of reordering up to a fixed basestock level z. We know that such a policy will be optimal for some z * , so we simply need to search for a value z that maximizes Π(z). In fact, we can verify the following (see the Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 2 The profit function Π(z) is concave in z.
We know that 0 ≤ z * ≤z, wherez ≡ max{z ∈ Z + :v − c > ∆h(z)} (see Lemma 5) orz = M if h(·) is not strictly convex. For a fixed z, we could use Monte Carlo simulation to calculate Π(z): just sample instances for (N, v) and take the average. In some cases, however, this can be avoided. Specifically, we can rewrite (18) conditioning on N and on the number of values above theĉ given in (7) . For a given realization n of N , and assuming by convention v (n+1) = 0, we have
where it can be easily checked that
This closed form for the expected profit reduces to a simple expression when buyer's values are uniformly distributed. Also, while computing the sum and from term p to p + 1, we can use the fact that n p+1 = n−p p+1 n p , to reduce the complexity introduced by the combinatorial numbers. Finally, taking advantage of the concavity of Π(z), a binary search over the range for z * gives an overall algorithm complexity of O(n logz). Henceforth, we will denote the optimal objective value Π * ≡ Π(z * ).
Comparisons to a list price mechanism
We next consider how the optimal auction policy compares to a traditional, fixed price policy. Specifically, we consider the case where the seller sets a fixed list price p in each period, and then replenish by ordering up to a fixed basestock level z. To be consistent with Section 3.4, the holding cost is charged at the beginning of the period and we assume buyers who are interested in acquiring one unit at the posted list price submit "acceptances". If the number of acceptances exceeds the current inventory of the seller, the units are randomly rationed to the buyers. It is easy to see that under this pricing mechanism, a dominant strategy for the buyers is to submit an "acceptance" if and only if their own values are higher than the list price.
We will compare the profits earned under our optimal mechanism with those under the list price mechanism for an optimal choice of p and z. Theoretical comparisons are provided first, followed by a numerical study of the two policies. The comparisons give some insight into when an auction-based mechanism has advantages over list pricing, and how much more beneficial it is.
Before proceeding, we note as mentioned in the Introduction that the dynamic list price and inventory problem was studied extensively by Federgruen and Heching [4, Section 4] . They showed that in the infinite horizon, stationary case, the optimal policy is in fact a basestock, list price policy of this form. However, there are differences between the problem Federgruen and Heching [4] analyzed and our setting: The first, which is minor, is that the authors assume that the holding cost is incurred at the end of the period, resulting in an expected inventory-backorder cost function G(y, p), where y is the inventory level at the beginning of the period, and p is the unit price. This can be mapped into our case by defining
, where b(·) is a backlog penalty function, and D(p) is the random demand faced at price p. Secondly, and more fundamentally, ours is a lost sales model while Federgruen and Heching allow backorders, and they do not provide a proof of the optimality of the basestock, list price policy in the lost sales cases. Still, this policy provides a useful benchmark for comparison in our case.
Theoretical comparisons of auction and list price policies
We first look at some theoretical comparisons of the optimal auction and list price policies. We will restrict ourselves to the average-cost case, where the optimal profit is given by optimizing (18) over z, though similar results can be developed for the discounted case. Our analysis shows that in several important cases, the list price policy is provably either optimal or asymptotically optimal, so there may be no benefit to the seller in using a auction mechanism in these (not unrealistic) settings.
To begin, let Π * LP denote the seller's average per-period expected profit under this list price setting. Let s denote the reserve price set by the seller, and let
be the random variable representing the number of buyers with valuations exceeding the reserve price s. The seller solves
Fix a value of z, and define the corresponding function Π LP (z) as
where the last equality follows by conditioning on the outcome of N (s). Note that the objective in (19) is continuous in s, positive for all s ∈ (c,v) and zero when s = c or s =v. So, the maximum is guaranteed to exist in the interval (c,v) and we can find it through standard line search methods. In next step, the seller must solve
The search space for z * LP is clearly bounded between 0 and M : the seller will not stock units beyond the maximum number of bidders that can show up in a particular period. We will keep the notation Π * LP = Π LP (z * LP ).
Small number of buyers per period
The first case where list pricing is optimal is when there is at most one buyer per period. Indeed, we have the following proposition, the proof of which is in the Appendix.
This shows that if the firm is receiving isolated bids (for example, as in Priceline.com's pricing mechanism), there is no inherent advantage to using auctions over list pricing -some aggregation of buyers is needed to gain a strict advantage through an auction mechanism. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that one needs to generate some bidding competition among buyers to realize a benefit from an auction. With at most one buyer bidding, no competition is created.
Large number of buyers per period and linear holding cost
While an auction is not beneficial if there are too few buyers per period, we next show that it is not beneficial if there are too many buyers either. Specifically, we show that if the holding cost is linear, of the form h(z) = a + h z, list pricing becomes optimal for the limiting problem where the number of buyers per period tends to infinity. An analogous result was shown for the finite horizon optimal auction design problem in Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24, Section 4.1]. Broadly speaking, as the number of buyers increases, the bid realizations become an accurate and dense sample of the value distribution F . As a result, the order statistics, which determine the winning set and price to be paid, will converge to appropriate fractiles of this distribution. The scaled auction profit then approaches a deterministic function of the basestock level z and of the minimum reserve priceĉ, making it asymptotically equivalent to the list price profit.
To proceed, we consider a sequence of problems indexed by n. Without loss of generality, we analyze the profits from using a second-price auction with fixed reserve priceĉ and an order-up-to policy with basestock level z n , since we know from Section 3.4 that such a policy optimizes the long-run average profit for a suitable choice of z n . The number of buyers in a period is denotedSolving the limiting problem (20) provides a simple approximation of the optimal base stock
Zero holding cost
Finally, the list price policy is also optimal in the limit as the holding cost tends to zero. Specifically we have (see the Appendix for a proof):
The intuitive reason for this result is that with no holding cost, the firm will stock the maximum inventory M at the start of each period under both the optimal auction and list price policies. As a result, there is no rationing of product and thus buyers do not face any bidding competition. Without bidding competition, the auction produces the same profits as the fixed price policy.
Numerical comparisons
We next look at the results of some numerical examples that illustrate cases in which an auction mechanism is more profitable than a list price mechanism. We restrict attention to the averageprofit versions of the problems as discussed in Section 3.4 and the beginning of Section 4.1, because the average-profit criterion is quite natural, easier to compare than a discounted criterion and the computations are quite straightforward. In every experiment that follows, we have solved the corresponding formulations (18) and (19) in closed form.
In order to study the impact of different parameters on the profits earned under both pricing mechanisms, we perturbed the parameters of the following base case: The ordering cost is normalized at c = 1; buyers' values are assumed uniform of width ∆ = 0.5 centered at c (i.e. buyers' values are centered at the cost, with ∆ representing the dispersion in valuations); there are a constant N = 50 buyers per period; and the holding cost is linear of the form h(z) = c i z, where i = 1% is the one-period interest rate.
We then varied individual parameters of this base case to see the effect on the absolute and relative performance of each policy. Along with expected profit, we computed a "fillrate" for each policy, defined as the expected number of buyers who get an item awarded divided by the expected number who attempt to purchase (e.g. those with values above the reserve price in the auction, or those with values above the fixed price in the list price case). Formally, the fill rate is the ratio
in the list price case, where s * is the optimal price calculated by the algorithm. The fillrate gives a measure of the scarcity of inventory relative to demand and is a traditional service measure in inventory problems.
The effect of the number of buyers per period
In our first experiment, we studied how the profit is affected by the number of buyers in each period. That number of buyers N was assumed constant, but N was varied from 1 to 1, 000. All other parameters are the same as in the base case. The results are summarized in Table 1 . As one would expect, the profits and inventory levels increase in both policies as the number of buyers increases. Also, as shown theoretically in Proposition 3, the list price mechanism is optimal in the limiting case of just one buyer per period. In the other extreme as n gets large, again the list price profit approaches the optimal auction profit, as predicted by the asymptotic result of Proposition 4. In particular, for our parameters, formula (20) gives an estimate of the optimal auction basestock level of z * = 0.24 N , which is quite close to the values in the third column of Table 1 for the cases N = 100 and N = 1000. The biggest benefit from the auction occurs at a moderate value of 5 customers per period, where it achieves a 3.2% increase in profits over list pricing.
The fillrate and inventory level is higher in the list price case. This suggests that the auction policy deliberately introduces some scarcity in the available goods to create more bidding competition among the buyers.
The effect of variability in the number of buyers per period
In our second experiment, we assumed that the number of bidders is uniformly distributed with mean 50. The variance of this distribution was then varied by changing the range of this discrete uniform random variable. All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Results are shown in Table 2 .
The main observation here is that as the variance in the number of buyers increases, the seller's profit decreases under both the auction and the list price policy and the auction becomes relatively more profitable. Thus, high levels of uncertainty about the number of bidders appears to favor the use of the auction mechanism. As in the previous experiment, we observe higher inventory levels and fillrates for the list price case. 
The effect of different interest rates
We next consider varying the interest rate i -or equivalently varying the holding cost rate since h(z) = c i z (with c = 1 in our case). Typically, this interest rate represents a cost of capital plus a rate of depreciation in the product's value over time. Table 3 shows the results. The small difference in the expected profits for the lowest interest rate confirms the result of Proposition 5; low holding cost leads to high inventory levels, which reduces the bidding competition and hence the benefit of the auction. As the interest rate rises, the auction performs relatively better, achieving a large 21.67% improvement when the interest rate reaches 10%. This is simply the reverse effect: A high holding cost means the firm is unwilling to stock much inventory. Since the number of buyers per period is unchanged, the number of buyers per unit of inventory increases; more competition among buyers is created and hence the auction mechanism performs relatively better.
It is worth pointing out, however, that there are few practical situations where interest rates of over 1% per period are observed, especially if one is considering auctions that are held relatively frequently (e.g. weekly). Rates this high are observed for products such as personal computers which become obsolete quickly, but for most goods weekly rates of less than one percent are the norm. Thus, the experiment suggests that either the product has to suffer fairly rapid depreciation -or selling events have to be relatively infrequent (e.g. monthly or semi-annual periods, not weekly) -for the firm to realize a significant benefit from using auctions over list pricing.
The effect of different levels of variability in buyers' valuations
Finally, we looked at the effect of different levels of variability in the buyers' valuations for items. Recall, these values are assumed to be uniformly distributed with mean one (i.e. centered around the ordering cost c = 1) with range ∆. Thus, the values are U (c − ∆ 2 , c + ∆ 2 ). We then varied ∆. All other parameters are the same as in the base case. Table 4 shows the results.
The main observation is that the seller benefits, both in the auction and in the list price setting, from increased variability in buyer's valuations. This is to be expected, because the firm can extract more consumer surplus from high-value buyers as the variation increases. The inventory level is also increasing with the variance, and the relative benefit from the auction mechanism is decreasing. Intuitively, there are two effects at work here. The first one is that with higher variation in valuations, there is more potential for profit gain through using the auction because it can potentially capture more consumer surplus. However, as the variability of the valuations increases, the level of inventory increases as well, reducing the bidding competition among buyers. In this example, this later effect dominates the former. One can construct other cases where more variation in valuations increases the relative benefit of the auction, for example when valuations are strictly higher than the cost c (rather than being centered at c as in this experiment).
Conclusions
With the rise of Internet commerce, auctions are increasingly viewed as a viable mechanism for pricing goods in retail and distribution businesses. Our results show that the optimal auction and replenishment policy in a stylized model of such systems is relatively simple, consisting of running a series of standard first-price or second-price auctions with fixed reserve price and following a simple order-up-to (basestock) policy for replenishment. Moreover, especially under the average-profit criterion, the optimal policy is very easy to compute. Thus, the structure and computation of an optimal auction-replenishment strategy is surprisingly simple, familiar and practical.
In addition, our comparisons with list pricing provide some insight into when an auction is likely to be beneficial. The somewhat surprising finding here is that there are relatively few cases in which auctions provide large benefits. If the number of buyers per auction is either very small or very large, list pricing is provably optimal; if holding costs are low, list pricing is again optimal. Auctions provided large benefits in our experiments only when 1) the number of buyers is moderate, 2) the carrying cost per period are large, and 3) there is significant variability in the number of bidders. Thus, while auctions are quite fashionable in e-commerce, perhaps there are sound theoretical reasons why list pricing remains popular. But when the conditions are right, auctions can indeed provide significant improvements in profits over list pricing.
If p * (x) = x − z * t−1 , using part (ii) of Lemma 1 for the x + 1-inventory case, we want to see that
But this holds because ∆R(x−z * t−1 ) > c by optimality of p * (x) in the x-inventory case; and because of the optimality of z * t−1 in (10), which gives:
The case p * (x) ≥ x − z * t−1 + 1 is easy: because of the optimality of p * (x) when
The optimal allocation p * (x + 1) may be higher, however, due to the additional unit in stock. Hence, p * (x + 1) ≥ p * (x).
For the RHS inequality, suppose by contradiction that p * (x + 1) > p * (x) + 1. First, take the case
But since ∆R(·) is decreasing,
contradicting the optimality of p * (x). On the other hand, when p * (x) ≥ x−z * t−1 −1, then from our supposition, p * (x+1) ≥ x+1−z * t−1 . So, we are in the last case of Lemma 1, part (ii), for the x+1-inventory case, and so ∆R(p * (x)+2) > c, contradicting again the optimality of p * (x). Furthermore, this tells us that in most cases where p * (x) ≥ x − z * t−1 − 1, then p * (x + 1) = p * (x), except possibly when p * (x) is binding (i.e., p * (x) = x). Regarding the relation between y * (x + 1) and y * (x), it follows by inspection from part (i) in Lemma 1. 2
Proof of Lemma 4
Again, recall that when referring to Lemma 1, we will be replacing G(·) by V t−1 (·); and accordingly,
We proceed by induction on t. For t = 0 the theorem trivially holds since V 0 (x) = 0 for all x. For period t − 1, the inductive hypothesis (IH) is that ∆V t−1 (x) ≥ ∆V t−1 (x + 1). Moreover, from (10) , this assures the existence of the optimal inventory position z * t−1 . We will then show that if IH holds, then ∆V t (x) is decreasing as well.
To do so, fix the number of bidders n t and consider a given realization v = (v 1 , . . . , v nt ) of bidders's valuations. Define the maximized value in (11) as:
and take the difference function
Note that for random N t and v,
Thus, it suffices to establish that ∆H t (x, n t , v) is decreasing in x to prove that ∆V t (x) is decreasing in x. For notational simplicity, we henceforth suppress the arguments n t , v in ∆H t (x, n t , v) and simply use ∆H t (x). Using (21) , observations (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma 1, and Lemma 3, we make the following statements: Therefore, ∆H t (x) ≥ ∆H t (x + 1).
Case 7: p * (x + 1) > p * (x) = p * (x − 1) ≡ p * and p * ≤ x − 1 − z * t−1 . Note that p * (x + 1) = p * + 1. So, ∆H t (x) = α ∆V t−1 (x − p * ) − ∆h(x − p * ) (by obs. Then, ∆H t (x) ≥ ∆H t (x + 1).
Thus, ∆H t (x) is decreasing. Taking expected value over all possible realizations of (n t , v) preserves this monotone property, and hence ∆V t (x) is decreasing as well, which completes the induction. 2
Proof of Lemma 5
We will work on a sample path argument, taking a realization (n t , v). Start by noting that ∆V t (x) < v, ∀t, x: To this end, consider observations 1-3 in the proof of Lemma 4. From observation 1 (for our purposes here, when p * = p * (x − 1) = p * (x)), we know that 
The composition Q(min{z, N(ĉ)}) turns out to be concave in z, and jointly with the convexity of h(·), we get the result. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows the guidelines of the one for an analogous result in the finite horizon problem described in Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras [24, Proposition 3] . We will show the result by proving the equality Π(z) = Π LP (z), ∀0 ≤ z ≤z. 
and from (19) , Π LP (z) = max 
For the latter, note that we can express the maximization problem as max s≥0 {(s − c)(1 − F (s))} P (N = 1) − h(z).
The optimal s * is the solution to the first order condition
Using the definition of J(·) (see formula (3)), we can alternatively write 
Since both expressions (23) and (24) are equivalent for every z, the optimal values are the same. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
We will prove that if h(z) = 0, then Π * LP = Π * . For the auction case, consider the benefit for a particular inventory level z:
{R(p) − c p}
We can then take z * = M , the maximum possible value for the random variable N . Then, Now, since Π * dominates Π * LP , then from the expression in (26) , it turns out that s * =ĉ, and hence, Π * = Π * LP . 2
